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Abstract—In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic frame-
work for studying the problem of minimizing the delay of
instantly decodable network coding (IDNC) for cooperative
data exchange (CDE) in decentralized wireless network. In
this configuration, clients cooperate with each other to recover
the erased packets without a central controller. Game theory
is employed herein as a tool for improving the distributed
solution by overcoming the need for a central controller or
additional signaling in the system. We model the session by self-
interested players in a non-cooperative potential game. The utility
functions are designed such that increasing individual payoff
results in a collective behavior achieving both a desirable system
performance in a shared network environment and the Nash
bargaining solution. Three games are developed: the first aims
to reduce the completion time, the second to reduce the maximum
decoding delay and the third the sum decoding delay. We improve
these formulations to include punishment policy upon collision
occurrence and achieve the Nash bargaining solution. Through
extensive simulations, our framework is tested against the best
performance that could be found in the conventional point-
to-multipoint (PMP) recovery process in numerous cases: first
we simulate the problem with complete information. We, then,
simulate with incomplete information and finally we test it in lossy
feedback scenario. Numerical results show that our formulation
with complete information largely outperforms the conventional
PMP scheme in most situations and achieves a lower delay. They
also show that the completion time formulation with incomplete
information also outperforms the conventional PMP.
Index Terms—Cooperative data exchange, instantly decodable
network coding, non-cooperative games, potential game, Nash
equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Network Coding
Since its introduction in [2], NC was shown to be a
promising technique to significantly improve the throughput
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and delays of packet recovery especially in wireless erasure
networks, due to the broadcast nature of their transmissions.
These merits are essential for real time applications requiring
reliable transmissions and fast recovery over erasure channels,
such as multimedia streaming [3].
Two important classes of NC for such applications can be
distinguished in the literature: the Random Network Coding
(RNC) [4], [5] and the Opportunistic Network Coding (ONC)
[6], [7]. RNC is implemented by combining packets with
independent, random and non zero coefficients [4]. Despite
its attractive benefits such as optimality in number of trans-
missions for broadcast applications and ability to recover even
without feedback [5], RNC is not suitable for the applications
of our interest since it does not allow progressive decoding
of the frame, is not optimal for multipoint to multipoint com-
munications (multicast) and require expensive computation at
the clients to decode the frame. In ONC, packet combinations
are selected according to the received/lost packet state of each
client [7]. ONC was show to be a graceful solution for packet
recovery for wireless network [8].
One ONC subclass that suits most of the aforementioned
applications is the instantly decodable network coding (IDNC)
since it provides instant and progressive decoding of packets.
IDNC can be implemented using binary XOR to encode and
decode packets. Furthermore, no buffer is needed at the clients
to store non instantly decodable packets for future decoding
possibilities. Thanks to its merits, IDNC was an intensive
subject of research [3], [9]–[21]. In [9], [10], the sum decoding
delay for PMP configuration was studied for perfect feedback
then extended to limited feedback scenario in [13], [22]–[24].
The maximum decoding delay was introduced in [25] as a
more reliable delay metric in IDNC, and algorithms to min-
imize this delay for PMP configuration have been proposed.
In [26], the authors studied the problem of minimizing the
completion time in IDNC. The completion time was proofed
to be related to the decoding delay in [27] and can be better
controlled with it.
B. Motivation and Related Work
In all aforementioned works, the base station of a point-to-
multipoint network (such as cellular, Wi-Fi and WiMAX and
roadside to vehicle networks) was assumed to be responsible
for the recovery of erased packets. This can pose a threat
on the resources of such base stations and their abilities
to deliver the required huge data rates especially in future
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wireless standards. This problem becomes more severe in
roadside to vehicle networks since the vehicles usually bypass
the roadside senders very fast and thus cannot rely on it for
packet recovery but rather on completing the missing packets
among themselves. One alternative to this problem is the
notion of cooperative data exchange (CDE) introduced in [28].
In this configuration, clients can cooperate to exchange data by
sending IDNC recovery packets to each other over short range
and more reliable communication channels, thus allowing
the base station to serve other clients. This CDE model
is also important for fast and reliable data communications
over ad-hoc networks, such vehicular and sensor networks.
Consequently, it is very important to study the minimization
of delays and number of transmissions in such IDNC-based
CDE systems.
Unlike conventional point-to-multipoint scenario, the IDNC
based CDE systems require not only decisions on packet
combinations but also on which client to send in every
transmission in order to achieve a certain quality for one of the
network metrics. Recently Aboutorab and al. [17] considered
the problem of minimizing the sum decoding delay for CDE
in a centralized fashion. By centralized, we mean that a
central unit (such as the base station in the cellular example)
takes the decisions on which client to send and which packet
combination in each transmission.
The aforementioned work considered a perfect and prompt
feedback from all the players. This assumption is too idealistic
given the impairments on feedback link [29] of wireless
networks, due to shadowing, high interference and fading.
In this situation, players will need to transmit several sub-
sequent packets without having any information (or partial
information) about their reception status at the other players.
Moreover, this scenario introduce a new dimension to the
problem since the information at the different players is no
longer common knowledge. When IDNC based CDE is used in
such uncertainties and non symmetric information, the players
will no longer be certain on the outcome of their actions, and
thus will not be certain about the resulting completion time
and decoding delays.
C. Contributions
In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic framework for
studying the problem of minimizing the delay of instantly
decodable network coding for cooperative data exchange in
decentralized wireless network. The problem is modeled as
cooperative control problem using game theory as a tool for
improving the distributed solution by overcoming the need for
a central controller or additional signaling in the system.
Cooperative control problems entail numerous autonomous
players seeking to collectively achieve a global objective. The
network coding problem is one example of a cooperative
control problems, in which the global objective is for all play-
ers to efficiently use a common resource by opportunistically
taking advantage of the possible coding occasions. The central
challenge in cooperative control problems is to derive a local
control mechanism for the individual players such that the
players operate in a manner that collectively serves the desired
global objective.
In this paper, we derive expressions for the individual
utility functions in such way that increasing individual payoff
results in a collective behavior achieving a desirable system
performance (minimizing one of the delay aspects) in a shared
network environment and achieving the Nash bargaining so-
lution. We then improve these game formulations to include
punishment policy and reduce the set of equilibrium to the one
dimensional line containing the Nash bargaining solution of
our interest. To the best of our knowledge, using game theory
tools to model IDNC-based CDE has not been addressed in the
literature and only heuristic algorithm were proposed to solve
the problem in a centralized fashion [17]. Moreover, this work
can serve as a background to build more complicated system
such as the multicast in which the packet demand of each
player can differ and players are not all in the transmission
range of each other.
The rest of this paper is divided as follows: Background
about game theory and specially potential games is briefly
recalled in Section II. In Section III, we present our network
model and protocol. The game parameters, formulations and
equilibrium investigation are presented in Section IV. The
punishment policy and the new game formulations with their
equilibrium are provided in Section V. In Section VI, we
present the algorithm used to simulate the system. Section VII
presents an extension of our study to the lossy feedback
scenario. Before concluding in Section IX, simulations results
are illustrated in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND: NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES
A. Definitions and Notations
We define a finite stochastic non-cooperative game, like in
[30], with a common state by the 6-uplet:
G = (M, {Ai}i,Ω, {Ai}i, {αi}i, q, {Ui}i), (1)
where:
• M = {1, ...,M} is the set of players,
• {Ai}i is the set of all possible actions during the course
of the game,
• Ω is the set of possible states of the game,
• Ai(ω) is the set of possible action for player i in the state
w ∈ Ω of the game,
• αi : Ω −→ 2Ai is the correspondence determining the
possible actions at a given state of a game,
• qt is the conditional distribution of the transition proba-
bility from state to state. For independent states games,
q is the distribution over the set Ω and can be ignored in
the definition of the game. Otherwise the game is called
competitive Markov decision process [31],
• Ui is the utility function of player i, which will be defined
further in the paper.
Let ω(t) ∈ Ω be the state of the game at the stage t. For
notation simplicity, the set of actions of player i at stage t
will be denoted by Ai(t) instead of Ai(ω(t)). Let A(t) =
2
A1(t)× ...×AM (t) be the set of all possible actions that can
be taken by all the players at the stage t of the game.
For an action profile at = (a1(t), ..., aM (t))
T ∈ A(t), let
at,−i denote the profile of players other than player i. In
other words, at,−i = (a1(t), ..., ai−1(t), ai+1(t), ...aM (t))
T.
The subscript T denote the transpose operator. We can write
a profile at of actions as (at,i, at,−i). Similarly, the notation
A−i(t) =
∏
j 6=i
Aj(t) refers to the set of possible actions of
all the player other than player i at stage t of the game. Let
ht = (ω(1), a(1), ..., a(t − 1),ω(t))T be the history of the
game at stage t that lies in the set:
Ht =
(
t−1⊗
t′=1
Ω×A(t′)
)
× Ω. (2)
The utility function Ui for player i is defined as:
Ui : A(t)×Ht −→ R
(at, ht) 7−→ Ui(at, ht), (3)
where in the notation X −→ Y , X refers to the set of
arguments and Y the set of images by the function and
x 7−→ f(x) gives the mapping of each argument.
We may write Ui(at, ht) as Ui(at,i, at,−i, ht). For clarity
purposes, the notation X refers to a matrix whose ith column
is Xi. The notation x refers to a vector whose ith entry is xi.
We denote by {0, 1}x×y the set of matrices of dimension x×y
containing only 0s and 1s. We also use the notation {0, 1}x to
refer to the set {0, 1}x×1. The notation [X1, ..., Xn] refers to
the matrix whose ith column is the vector Xi and the notation
X = [xij ] refers to a matrix X whose ith row and j column is
the element xij . The game G is said to be finite if the number
of times it is played is finite. For such games, let T be the
final stage of the game.
B. Potential Games
Potential games have been introduced in [32]. The definition
of a potential game G is given by:
Definition 1. The game G is an exact potential game if there
exists a function φ such that:
∀ i ∈M,∀ t, ∀ at, a′t ∈ A(t), (4)
Ui(at, ht)− Ui(a′t,i, at,−i, ht) =
φ(at, ht)− φ(a′t,i, at,−i, ht).
In other words, a game G is an exact potential game if there is
a function φ that measures exactly the difference in the utility
due to unilaterally deviation of each player [30].
Such a function φ is called the exact potential of the game.
Note that such potential does not directly guarantee the Pareto
optimality of the Nash Equilibrium (see Cournot oligopolies
[32]). Both Pareto optimality and Nash Equilibrium will be
defined in the next section. Instead of being a warranty of
Pareto efficiency, the potential function can be seen as a
quantification of the disagreement among the players [32]. In
the dynamic system [33], the potential represents a Lyapunov
function of the game.
Note that other type of potential games can be found in the
literature: the weighted, ordinal, generalized and best-response
potential games [34]. The theorems stated in the next section
will not depend on the nature of the potential game considered
and hold for all of them [30] as far as the game is potential.
C. Equilibrium Existence and Pareto Optimality
The definition of the Pure Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the
following:
Definition 2. An action profile a∗t ∈ A(t) is called a Pure
Nash equilibrium if:
∀ i ∈M, Ui(a∗t , ht) = max
at,i∈Ai(t)
Ui(at,i, a∗t,−i, ht). (5)
In other words, a NE is an action profile a∗t in which no player
can increase his utility by unilateral deviation. In engineering
system, the NE is a stable point to operate [35].
An attractive property of the NE is called the Pareto-
Optimum Nash Equilibrium (PONE) which is defined as:
Definition 3. An action profile a∗t ∈ A(t) is called a Pareto-
Optimum Nash Equilibrium if for all NE action profile b∗t , we
have:
∀ i ∈M, Ui(a∗t , ht) ≥ Ui(b∗t , ht). (6)
In other words, the PONE is the NE that achieves the highest
utility for all the players among all the other NE.
General results about equilibrium existence and uniqueness
are provided in [36]. Since our problem is a cooperative
control game, then we can make use of the results of the po-
tential games [37]. Before stating the main results concerning
equilibrium of potential games, we first define the coordination
game [33]:
Definition 4. Let G = (M, {Ai}i,Ω, {Ai}i, {αi}i, q, {Ui}i)
be a potential game with a potential function φ. The game
G′ = (M, {Ai}i,Ω, {Ai}i, {αi}i, q, φ) is called the coordi-
nation game of G.
The following theorem gives the relationship in terms of
equilibrium between the potential game and its associated
coordination game:
Theorem 1. Let G be a potential game with potential φ and
G′ its associated coordination game. Then the set of NEs of
G coincides with the set of NEs of G′. Moreover, the actions
profile a∗t ∈ A(t) maxima of φ are NE of G.
Proof: The proof of this theorem can be found in [33].
Note that the converse of this theorem is not generally true
i.e. not all the NEs of G are maxima of φ [33]. The existence
of a NE in potential game is ensured by this corollary:
Corollary 1. Every finite potential game admits at least one
NE.
Proof: The proof comes directly from Theorem 1. For a
finite game, the potential function is finite and therefore have
at least one maximum and thus the game admits at least one
NE.
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The following theorem characterize the PONE in a coordi-
nation game:
Theorem 2. Let G be a potential game with potential φ such
that its corresponding coordination game is itself i.e. G = G′
then the maximum of φ is the PONE of G.
Proof: According to Theorem 1, the maximum a∗t of φ
is a NE of G and since φ is the utility function of G therefore
a∗t is a NE that yields the highest utility. More specifically a
∗
t
yields the highest utility among all the NE of G and thus it is
the PONE.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND PROTOCOL
A. Network Model
The network we consider in this paper consists of a set
M = {1, ...,M} geographically close clients (players) that
require the reception of source packets that the base station
(BS) holds. Each player is interested in receiving the frame
N = {1, ..., N} of source packets regardless of the order.
In the first n time slots, the BS broadcasts the N source
packets of the frame N uncoded. Each player i is experiencing
a packet erasure probability qi assumed to be constant during
this phase. Each player listens to the transmitted packets
and sends an acknowledgement (ACK) upon each successful
reception of each packet. We assume that at the end of this
initial phase, each packet of the frame is at least acknowledged
by one of the players. Otherwise, this packet is re-transmitted
by the BS.
After this initialization phase, for each player i, the packets
of the frame N can be in one of the following sets:
• The Has set (denoted by Hi): The sets of packets suc-
cessfully received by player i.
• The Wants set (denoted by Wi): The sets of packets that
were erased at player i. Clearly, we have Wi = N \Hi.
In this configuration, we assume a perfect reception of
the acknowledgement by all the players and that each player
knows the packets sets of all the other players. Each player
stores the information obtained after the transmission at time
(t−1) in a state matrix (SM) S(t) = [sij(t)], ∀ i ∈M, ∀ j ∈
N such that:
sij(t) =
{
0 if j ∈ Hi(t)
1 if j ∈ Wi(t).
(7)
Note that the system model presented at the end of the
initial phase can be seen as a wireless sensor network that
need to exchange a set N of packets and each node holds
a subset (maybe overlapping) of the frame. An application
of in wireless sensor network is presented in Section VI. In
Section VII, we will extend our study to the limited feedback
scenario.
B. Network Protocol
After the initial transmission, the recovery phase starts.
In this phase, the players cooperate to recover their missing
packets by transmitting to each other binary XOR encoded
packets of the source packets they already hold in order to
minimize the decoding delay.
The packet combination is chosen according to the available
packets they have, the information available in the SM and the
expected erasure patterns of the links. Let P = [pij ], i, j ∈M
denote the packet erasure probability (i.e. the probability to
loss a packet) from player j to player i. All the packet
erasure probabilities are assumed to be constant during the
transmission of the frame. Since the packet erasure probability
depends not only on the link but also on the available power
used to transmit, therefore pij can be different from pji.
We assume that each player knows all the packet erasure
probabilities linking him to other players (i.e. player i knows
pji, ∀ j ∈ N ) and that each transmission can be heard by all
the players. Therefore only one player will transmit a packet
combination at each time slot. Otherwise, due to interference
between transmissions, none of the players will be able to
decode a packet.
In this phase, the transmitted coded packets can be one of
the following three options for each player i:
• Instantly Decodable: A packet is instantly decodable for
player i if the encoded packet contain at most one packet
the player does not have so far. In other words, it contains
only one packet from Wi.
• Non-Instantly Decodable: A packet is non instantly de-
codable for player i if it contains more than one packet
missing for that player. In other words, it contains at least
two packets from Wi.
• Non-innovative: A packet is non-innovative for player i
if it do not allow him to reduce its Wants set. In other
words, it does not contains packets from Wi.
We define the conventional decoding delay [9], [10] as follows:
Definition 5. At any cooperative phase transmission, a player
i, with non-empty Wants set, experiences a one unit increase
of decoding delay if it successfully receivers a packet that is
either non-innovative or non-instantly decodable.
The cooperation decoding delay can be defined as:
Definition 6. At any cooperative phase transmission, a player
i, with non-empty Wants set, experiences a one unit increase of
decoding delay if not exactly one player transmitted or only
one player transmitted and its conventional decoding delay
increases.
In other words, if more than one or none players transmits,
all the players will experience a decoding delay and if player
i is the only transmitting player, he will experience a delay
along with all players that successfully received a packet that
is either non-innovative or non-instantly decodable. In the rest
of the paper, we will use the term decoding delay to refer to
the cooperative decoding delay. We define the targeted players
by a transmission as the players that can instantly decode a
packet from that transmission. After each transmission in the
recovery phase, its targeted players send acknowledgements
consisting of one bit indicating the successful reception. This
process is repeated until all players report that they obtained
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all the packets. Let T be final stage of the game. The definition
of T can be written as:
T = min {t ∈ N∗ such that S(t) = 0}. (8)
Since we assume single hop transmissions, which means
that all the players are in the transmission range of each other,
each of them can already overhear all the feedback sent by
the other players and thus the system does not require any
additional feedback load.
IV. GAME FORMULATION
In this section, we first introduce the game parameter to
be able to model the problem of minimizing the delay in
IDNC as a non-cooperative potential game. We then provide
the expression of the utilities for the completion time, the sum
decoding delay and the maximum decoding delay games. As
first formulation of the problem, we will consider the delay as
the natural cost in our games. We finally analyze the different
NE equilibrium present in these games.
A. Game Parameters
Let κi(t) be the optimal packet combination that player i
can generate at the stage t of the game. We have κi(t) ∈
{0, 1}N with κij(t) = 1 means that packet j is included in
the packet combination and 0 otherwise. The mathematical
expression of these combination can be found in [38] for the
completion time, in [25] for the maximum decoding delay
and in [9] for the sum decoding delay. Since the SM is known
by all players, therefore each player can compute the optimal
packet combination (or a sub-optimal since the computation of
the optimal was shown to be NP-hard) of all the other players.
At each stage of the game, each player has two possible
actions: either he transmits or he listens. Therefore, we define
the action space of player i at each stage t of the game as
Ai(t) = {transmit κi(t), remain silent}. Note that the action
space of the players are not symmetric since each player can
transmit a different packet combination at each stage. Let at be
the actions taken by all the users at the stage t. For simplicity
of notation, we will define at as the following:
at : A(t) −→ {0, 1}M
(a1(t), ..., aM (t)) 7−→ at = (b1(t), ..., bM (t))T,
(9)
where,
bi(t) =
{
0 if ai(t) = {remain silent}
1 otherwise.
(10)
The set of targeted players by a packet combination are
those that can instantly decode an innovative packet from
the combination. Let τκ(t) be the set of targeted player by
the packet combination κ at the stage t of the game. The
mathematical definition of this set is given by:
τ : {0, 1}N −→ {0, 1}M
κ(t) 7−→ τκ(t) = (τ1(κ(t)), ..., τM (κ(t)),
(11)
where:
τi(κ(t)) =
{
1 if
∑N
j=1 sij(t)κj(t) = 1
0 otherwise.
(12)
The players that experience a conventional decoding delay
after a transmission are those with non-empty Wants set and
are not targeted by the transmission. Define τκ(t) = 1− τκ(t)
as the set of non targeted players and let Mw(t) be the set of
players with non-empty Wants set defined as follows:
Mwi (t) =
{
0 if
∑N
j=1 sij(t) = 0
1 otherwise.
(13)
The state ω of the game is the erasure patterns of the links
between each couple of players. These states can be described
by the following formula:
ω : N∗ −→ Ω = {0, 1}M×M
t 7−→ ω(t) = [Xij ], 1 ≤ i, j ≤M , (14)
where Xij is a Bernoulli random variable defined as follows:
Xij =
{
0 with probability pij
1 with probability 1− pij .
(15)
The Xij are independent of each other and therefore the
ω(t) are independent identically distributed (iid). The game
can be seen as a random matrix game. We now can compute
the decoding delay Dw,κ experienced by all the users when
user i sends the packet combination κ at the stage t using the
following expression:
Dwi,κ(t) : {0, 1}M+N −→ {0, 1}M
(ωi(t), κ(t)) 7−→ ωi(t) ◦ τκ(t) ◦Mw(t),
(16)
where ◦ is the Hadamard product. We also define the cu-
mulative decoding delay experienced by all players since the
beginning of the recovery phase (beginning of the game) until
the stage t of the game:
D : {0, 1}M ×Ht −→ {0, 1}M
(at, ht) 7−→ D(at, ht), (17)
where:
D(at, ht) =
D(at−1, ht−1) +M
w(t) if ||at||1 6= 1
D(at−1, ht−1) +Dwi,κi(t) otherwise
with i such that ai(t) = ||at||1.
(18)
In the case of the Point to Multipoint (PMP) recovery
process (when only the base station is transmitting), the
completion time Ci can be approximated [38] by the following
expression:
C˜i =
Wi +Di − qi
1− qi . (19)
Since in the CDE, all users may be transmitting to each other,
then the completion time can be approximated by:
Ci =
Wi +Di − pi
1− pi
, (20)
where pi is the average erasure probability linking the player
i to the other players. This average erasure probability can
be expressed in terms of the erasure matrix as follows: pi =||P i||1
M
. Let C be the vector of the completion times, W the
vector of the size of the Wants sets and p the one of the average
erasures. Therefore, we define the expected completion time
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of each player as follows:
C : {0, 1}M ×Ht −→ {0, 1}M
(at, ht) 7−→ (W +D(at, ht)− p)./(1− p),
(21)
where the operator x./y refers to the division of each element
of vector x by the element of vector y.
B. Utility Functions
In this section, we give the formulation of the completion
time, maximum decoding delay and sum decoding delay
games. In this first formulation, we take the cost (-utility)
function to be the natural delay in the network.
Game 1 (Completion time Game):
• Players: Users in set M
• History : ht = Channel realization ω(t) and players’
action at at each stage t ≥ 1.
• Strategies: Contingency plans for selection transmission
policy at each stage t ≥ 1 and for any given history ht.
• Utilities: UCTi for each player i, where at each stage t ≥ 1
and for any given history ht and action profile at:
UCTi : {0, 1}M ×Ht −→ R
(at, ht) 7−→ −||C(at, ht)||∞. (22)
Game 1 is a non-cooperative stochastic game [30]. Since the
utility function do not depend on the player, therefore this
game belongs to the potential game class.
Game 2 (Maximum decoding delay Game):
• Players: Users in set M
• History : ht = Channel realization ω(t) and players’
action at at each stage t ≥ 1.
• Strategies: Contingency plans for selection transmission
policy at each stage t ≥ 1 and for any given history ht.
• Utilities: UMDDi for each player i, where at each stage
t ≥ 1 and for any given history ht and action profile at:
UMDDi : {0, 1}M ×Ht −→ R
(at, ht) 7−→ −||D(at, ht)||∞. (23)
Similar to Game 1, Game 2 is also a non-cooperative stochastic
potential game.
Game 3 (Sum decoding delay Game):
• Players: Users in set M
• History : ht = Channel realization ω(t) and players’
action at at each stage t ≥ 1.
• Strategies: Contingency plans for selection transmission
policy at each stage t ≥ 1 and for any given history ht.
• Utilities: USDDi for each player i, where at each stage
t ≥ 1 and for any given history ht and action profile at:
USDDi : {0, 1}M ×Ht −→ R
(at, ht) 7−→ −||D(at, ht)||1. (24)
Similar to Game 1 and Game 2, Game 3 is also a non-
cooperative stochastic potential game.
C. Game Equilibrium Analysis
The following Theorem gives the set of the NE of Game 1:
Theorem 3. The set of NE of Game 1 is:
E(t) =
{
A(t) if Z(t) = ∅
E1(t) otherwise ,
(25)
with
E1(t) = {at ∈ A(t) such that ||at||1 = 1 or ||at||1 > 2
or (||at||1 = ai(t) + aj(t) = 2 and i, j /∈ Z(t))}.
(26)
where the set Z is the set defined by
Z(t) = {j ∈M such that Yj(t) < Y0(t)}, (27)
and Y0(t) = max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
is the increase in the cost function
when not exactly one player is transmitting and Yj(t) =
max
i∈Q(t)∩Dwj,κj (t)
1
1− pi
the cost when only player j is trans-
mitting with Q(t) defined as:
Q(t) = {i ∈M such that (28)
Ci(at−1, ht−1) + 1/(1− pi) > ||C(at−1, ht−1)||∞
and Mwi = 1}.
Proof: The proof of this Theorem can be found in
Appendix A.
The set of NE of Game 2 are given in the following
Theorem:
Theorem 4. The set of NE of Game 2 is:
E(t) =
{
A(t) if Z(t) = ∅
E1(t) otherwise ,
(29)
with
E1(t) = {at ∈ A(t) such that ||at||1 = 1 or ||at||1 > 2
or (||at||1 = ai(t) + aj(t) = 2 and i, j /∈ Z(t))}.
(30)
where the set Z is the set defined by
Z(t) = {i ∈M such that Dωi,κi ◦ qt = 0}, (31)
with qi(t) = 1 if Di(at−1, ht−1) = ||D(at−1, ht−1)||∞ and
Mwi = 1, otherwise 0.
Proof: The proof of this Theorem can be found in
Appendix B.
The following Theorem introduces the set of NE of Game
3:
Theorem 5. The set of NE of Game 3 is:
E(t) = {at ∈ A(t) such that ||at||1 = 1 or ||at||1 > 2}.
(32)
Proof: The proof of this Theorem can be found in
Appendix C.
These games formulation, thought well defined for a system
with perfect and complete information (i.e. all the information
in the system are common knowledge by all the players),
suffers from many flaws when the information is incomplete.
First, by inspection of the NEs of the games, we clearly can see
that most of the NEs yield the worst payoff. In all these game
formulations, the action profile at ∈ A(t) such that ||at||1 > 2
is a NE of the game. The number of this type of action is
(
M
3
)
compared to the M actions profile of our interest (i.e. action
profiles in which only one player is transmitting). Secondly,
in incomplete information scenario and without a punishment
policy, the game can loop infinitely without reducing the Wants
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set of any player. For these reasons, the overall performance
of the games will be very poor in the incomplete information
scenario and a more robust definition of the game must be
addressed.
V. PUNISHMENT AND BARGAINING
In this section, we first build up a punishment policy to
prevent multiple collision to occur in the network. We, then,
reformulate the problem as a Nash bargaining problem in
order to provide a more efficient solution and we provide the
expression of the utility of the new version of the completion
time, the maximum decoding delay and the sum decoding
delay games. We reformulate the games in such a way that
only the actions profile of our interest (those that can reduce a
Wants set of at least one of the players) are NE of the games.
This reformulation as shown at the end of the section, will
provide more robust NE and allow the system to operate with
more efficiently incomplete information.
A. Punishment and Back-off Function
In the first definition of the game, after a collision occurs,
each of the players that transmitted can re-transmit in the next
stage of the game. In order to overcome the scenario in which
multiple consecutive collisions occur, we impose a punishment
period of V to every player responsible of a collision. In other
words, players responsible of a collision will back-off and will
not be able to transmit during the next V transmissions. Let
ct = (c1(t), ..., cM (t))
T ∈ {0, 1}M be the collision indicator
defined as follows:
ci(t) =
{
1 if ai(t) = 1 and ||at||1 > 1
0 otherwise.
(33)
Let C be the collision history over the last V stage of the
game. The mathematical definition of this variable is:
C : Ht −→ {0, 1}M×V
ht 7−→ C(ht) = [ct−V , ..., ct−1]. (34)
For notation consistency, the collision indicator for a non
positive time index is taken 0 i.e. c−t = 0, ∀ t ≥ 0. The
back-off function indicates at each stage t of the game which
players are allowed to transmit. The mathematical definition
of this function is:
B : {0, 1}M×V −→ {0, 1}M
C(ht) 7−→ B(ht) = C(ht)1. (35)
Let A′i(t) be the action space of player i at each stage t of
the game defined as follows:
A′i(t) =
{
Ai(t) if Bi(ht) = 0
{remain silent} otherwise. (36)
B. New Game Formulation
The Nash bargaining solution is a solution concept intro-
duced by Nash initially for the two-player games. Whereas
the formulation of the non-cooperative games involves details
about the utility functions, the formulation of the cooperative
games is generally based on an abstract approach of the
problem where only the gain of the collation is presented
without stating how this gain is earned. One important idea of
the bargaining theory is that solution concepts of cooperative
games can be interpreted as non-cooperative games based on
individual utility maximization from the knowledge/belief of
the players. The construction of non-cooperative bargaining
games that sustain multiple cooperative solution concepts as
their equilibrium outcomes is mainly based on the idea of
having a solution which is fair and more efficient than the
one obtained without bargaining or agreement. The bargaining
solution is characterized by its Pareto optimality, individ-
ual rationality, invariance to positive affine transformation,
independence of irrelevant alternatives and symmetry. The
following theorem links the bargaining solution to the Pareto-
optimal action profile:
Theorem 6. For games with unique Pareto-optimal action
profile, we can construct a game in which there exists a
unique Nash bargaining solution verifying the axioms of the
bargaining solution. This solution is the unique Pareto-optimal
action profile.
Proof: The proof of this Theorem can be found in [30].
According to Theorem 2, the Pareto-optimal action profile
of our game is the PONE. Therefore, if the PONE of the game
is unique, the bargaining solution is the PONE of the game.
We now design the new game to fulfill this condition.
Game 4 (New completion time Game):
• Players: Users in set M
• History : ht = Channel realization ω(t) and players’
action at at each stage t ≥ 1.
• Strategies: Contingency plans for selection of a transmis-
sion policy at each stage t ≥ 1 and for any given history
ht.
• Utilities: UCTi for each player i, where at each stage t ≥ 1
and for any given history ht and action profile at:
In this version of the game, we encourage sparsity by the `1
regularizer. Moreover, prioritization between players is added
when all action profiles will yield a higher maximum excepted
completion time than in the previous stage of the game. This
additional term is scaled by the number of player to not change
the original game. The mathematical definition of the new
utility is the following:
UCTi (at, ht) = −||C(at, ht)||∞ − ||at||1
− ||D(at, ht)−D(at−1, ht−1)||1
M
. (37)
Game 5 (New maximum decoding delay Game):
• Players: Users in set M.
• Actions Space: Action in the set {A′i}i.
• History : ht = Channel realization ω(t) and players’
action at at each stage t ≥ 1.
• Strategies: Contingency plans for selection of a transmis-
sion policy at each stage t ≥ 1 and for any given history
ht.
• Utilities: UMDDi for each player i, where at each stage
t ≥ 1 and for any given history ht and action profile at.
As in the previous game. we encourage sparsity and add a
scaled term to take into account the cases when the maximum
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decoding delay cannot be kept at the same level in the next
stage of the game. The new payoff function is the following:
UMDDi (at, ht) = −||D(at, ht)||∞ − ||at||1
− ||D(at, ht)−D(at−1, ht−1)||1
M
. (38)
Game 6 (New sum decoding delay Game):
• Players: Users in set M.
• Actions Space: Action in the set {A′i}i.
• History : ht = Channel realization ω(t) and players’
action at at each stage t ≥ 1.
• Strategies: Contingency plans for selection of a transmis-
sion policy at each stage t ≥ 1 and for any given history
ht.
• Utilities: USDDi for each player i, where at each stage
t ≥ 1 and for any given history ht and action profile at.
In order to encourage sparsity of the action profile vector at,
the `1 regularizer is added to the previous definition of the
utility function.
USDDi (at, ht) = −||D(at, ht)||1 − ||at||1. (39)
As for Game 1, Game 2, and Game 3, Games 4, 5 and 6
are non-cooperative stochastic potential games. In these game
formulations, we reduced the set of equilibrium to the one
dimensional line (in which only one player is transmitting)
containing the Nash bargaining solution of our interest. In the
next section, we further proof that the improved definitions of
the games have a more stable equilibrium.
C. Equilibrium Stability
In virtue of Corollary 1, in all the games, there exist at least
one NE. Moreover, according to Theorem 2, the maximum of
the utility function is the PONE of the game. However, the
existence of the NE or the PONE is not sufficiency. We first
define the price of anarchy, introduced in [39] to be able to
characterize the equilibrium in a game.
Definition 7. The price-of-anarchy (PoA), at stage t, is the
worst-case efficiency of a Nash Equilibrium among all possible
strategies. In other words, the PoA is defined as:
PoA(t) =
maxs∈S(t)W (s)
mins∈E(t)W (s)
, (40)
where:
• S(t) is the set of all possible strategies at stage t,
• E(t) is the set of all NE at stage t,
• W : S −→ R is a fairness function .
The PoA is a concept that measures how the efficiency of a
game degrades due to selfish behavior of its players. Since we
have in our game the Pareto Equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium
and the utility function is the same for all the players (the
corresponding coordination game is the game itself), then the
previous definition reduces to the following:
PoA(t) =
maxs∈E(t)φ(s)
mins∈E(t)φ(s)
. (41)
The utility function is always negative in our context.
Therefore, the PoA is a well defined quantity. In this paper,
since the utility function is strictly negative, we will compute
the PoA using the cost function φ′ = −φ. The PoA can be
expressed in terms of the cost function as follows:
PoA(t) =
mins∈E(t)φ′(s)
maxs∈E(t)φ′(s)
. (42)
Note that, since the Pareto-Optimal action profile is a NE of
the game, the price of stability [40] in our game is equal to 1
and can not be used to characterize efficiency. The following
theorem gives the PoA of the Game 1 and Game 4:
Theorem 7. The PoA of Game 1 can be expressed as follows:
PoA(t) =
1 if Z(t) = ∅
1−
Y0(t)− min
j∈Z(t)
(Yj(t))
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + Y0(t)
otherwise ,
(43)
where φ′ = −UCTi , ∀ i ∈M is the cost of Game 1. The PoA
of Game 4 can be expressed as follows:
PoA′(t) = (44)
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Yi(t)
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Yi(t)
if Z(t) 6= ∅
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Y0(t)
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Y0(t)
otherwise .
where φ′ = −UCTi , ∀ i ∈M is the cost of Game 4.
Proof: The proof of this Theorem can be found in
Appendix A for Game 1 and Appendix D for Game 4.
For stage t of the game with Z(t) = ∅, the expected
completion time will increase anyway and thus the PoA do
not have a practical signification in this case. In stage t where
Z(t) 6= ∅, we have:
PoA′(t) > PoA(t). (45)
This new definition of the game offers a more efficient
equilibrium.
The following theorem gives the PoA of the Game 2 and
Game 5:
Theorem 8. The PoA of Game 2 can be expressed as follows:
PoA(t) =

1 if Z(t) = ∅
1− 1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + 1
otherwise .
(46)
where φ′ = −UMDDi , ∀ i ∈ M is the cost of Game 2. The
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PoA of Game 5 can be expressed as follows:
PoA′(t) = (47)
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 2
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 2
if Z(t) = ∅
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1
otherwise .
where φ′ = −UMDDi , ∀ i ∈M is the cost of Game 5.
Proof: The proof of this Theorem can be found in
Appendix B for Game 2 and Appendix E for Game 5.
For stage t of the game with Z(t) = ∅, the maximum delay
will increase anyway and thus the PoA do not have a practical
signification in this case. In stage t where Z(t) 6= ∅, we have:
PoA′(t) > PoA(t). (48)
This new definition of the game offers a more efficient
equilibrium.
The following theorem gives the PoA of the Game 3 and
Game 6:
Theorem 9. The PoA of Game 3 can be expressed as follows:
PoA(t) =
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Dωi,κi ||1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Mw(t)||1
. (49)
where φ′ = −USDDi , ∀ i ∈ M is the cost of Game 3. The
PoA of Game 6 can be expressed as follows:
PoA′(t) =
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Dωi,κi ||1 + 1
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Dωi,κi ||1 + 1
.
(50)
where φ′ = −USDDi , ∀ i ∈M is the cost of Game 6.
Proof: The proof of this Theorem can be found in
Appendix C for Game 3 and Appendix F for Game 6.
Clearly, we have:
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
||Dωi,κi ||1 ≤ ||Mw(t)||1 − 1. (51)
Therefore, we obtain:
PoA′(t) ≥ PoA(t). (52)
This new definition of the game offers a more efficient
equilibrium.
After investigation of the Price-Of-Anarchy of the two
versions of the games, the new formulation of the games
offers a more efficient equilibrium. Therefore, for any learning
algorithm and a long running period, the second formulation
will performs better in terms of delay than the first one.
VI. DISTRIBUTED LEARNING ALGORITHMS
In this section, we introduce the learning algorithm used to
simulate the system in two settings. First, we assume complete
and perfect information. The former assumption means that
the actions available to the players and the utility functions
are common knowledge i.e. every player knows the data of
the game, every player knows that the other players know the
data of the game, every player knows that every player knows
that every players knows the data of the game, and so on, ad
infinitum. The latter assumption means all the players know
the history of the game perfectly. Note that these assumptions
do not add extra constraints to the problem but are rather
intrinsic to it when the system operate with full feedback. We
use the best response algorithm to simulate such a system.
In the second part, we propose a low complexity system in
which the players do not compute the packet combination that
the other players can make. In term of game theory terms, this
assumption means that the system will operate with incomplete
information. Although all the information is available at every
node, the action set of other player is not common knowledge
between players and each player know only its action set. This
application is motivated by the wireless sensor network. In this
type of network, the nodes do not have the necessary power
to do the computation of all the packet combination that other
node can make and thus can sacrifice optimality to save energy
by making less efficient decision. To simulate this system, we
will make use of the reinforcement learning algorithm.
A. Best Response Algorithm
In the original formulation of the best response algorithm,
by Cournot [41], players choose their actions sequentially.
At each time slot, a player selects the action that is the
best response to the action chosen by the other players in
the previous time slot. Since the state of the game is not
known to players, the utility function will be replaced by
the expected utility function. This can be done by replacing
the actual state ωi(t) by its expected value P i(t) in (16).
The following theorem characterize the outcome of the best-
response algorithm for our games:
Theorem 10. For our games with perfect and complete
information, the best-response algorithm will make the system
operate in the PONE of the game.
Proof: To proof this theorem, we fist introduce the
following theorem:
Theorem 11. Let G be a best-reply potential game with V a
best response potential. If the action a∗t maximizes V , then a∗t
is a NE.
Proof: The proof of this theorem can be found in [42].
From our previous analysis, the NE of the games are located
on the one dimensional line in which only one player is
transmitting. Let a∗t be the PONE of the game such that
||a∗t ||1 = ai(t) = 1. Assume that the outcome of the best-
response algorithm is the action profile a′t 6= a∗t . In virtue
of Theorem 11 and our previous analysis, the action profile
will have ||a′t||1 = aj(t) = 1, j 6= i. For simplicity, assume
that players take action sequentially in order. Assume first that
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j < i i.e. player j will take action before player i. Therefore,
player j did not take its best-response game because he can
insure better payoff by choosing not to transmit. Hence, we
obtain j ≥ i. Assume now j > i. Since player i is taken
its best action then it will transmit. According to theorem 11
player j is unable to transmit otherwise the outcome will not
be a NE of the game. Therefore we obtain i = j. In other
words, the only outcome of the best-response algorithm is the
PONE of the game.
In this setting, every node compute the packet combination
that the other nodes can make, allowing it to completely com-
pute the payoff function. Therefore, this setting is equivalent
to the centralized setting since all the computation is done
at each and every node. Note that with complete and perfect
information, as stated previously, the system will work on the
PONE of the game. Therefore, in such a system, no collisions
will occurs. In that case, the cooperative decoding delay will be
equivalent to the conventional decoding delay and the system
will not suffer from any additional delay due to the cooperation
between players.
B. Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
Reinforcement learning [43] was originally studied in the
context of a single player game. It was formalized in [44] to
study the behavior of animals. The idea behind this algorithm
is that the players interact with their environment and depend-
ing on the outcome of the past actions, they decide to choose or
avoid certain actions. Actions, that led to a high (satisfactory)
payoff by the past, are repeated if the same situation occurs.
Actions that were not satisfactory tend to be avoided. In a
game theory context, reinforcement learning is implemented
by associating a probability distribution over the set of possible
actions for all players and update these distributions according
to the perceived payoff at each stage of the game. In this
paper, we will use the reinforcement algorithm introduced by
Bush and Mosteller [45] for stochastic games with two-players
two-actions. In this algorithm, players select stochastically the
actions to take according to their probabilities. Formally, the
probability xj that player j take the action sj at stage t + 1
is calculated as follows:
xj,t+1(sj) =
{
xj,t(sj) + λjsj,t(1− xj,t(sj)) if sj,t ≥ 0
xj,t(sj) + λjsj,txj,t(sj) if sj,t < 0,
(53)
where λj is the learning rate of player j (0 < λj < 1), and
sj,t is the stimulus of action ai (−1 < sj,t < 1) defined as
follows:
sj,t =
φj(ai, t)−Mj
max
a∈A
|φj(a, t)−Mj |, (54)
with φj(a, t) is the payoff perceived by player j at time t after
taking the action a and Mj is a satisfactory level for player j.
For the potential game class, the reinforcement algorithm
converge to a NE of the game with probability 1 [42] for
any learning rate and satisfactory threshold. For simplicity
purposes, we will not study, in this paper, the optimal choice
of the learning rate or the satisfactory threshold. The learning
rate of a player i will be chosen to be the ratio of its Has set
|Hi| by the total number of packets N and the satisfactory
criterion will be −|Mw|1 +  for some  > 0. In other words,
the player is satisfied if at least one player is targeted (any
action profile that will not yield the worst payoff).
This algorithm will be fluctuating between a stabilization
and a stable states. In the stabilization state, players with
the biggest Has set will be more likely to transmit. If a
collision occurs due to multiple simultaneous transmissions,
the responsible players will back-off. This process is repeated
until only one player transmits. When this occurs, the system
reaches a stable state in which this player will continue to
transmit in the following stages until he become enable to
satisfy any other player. When this occur, the payoff will not
be satisfactory any longer and the system switches to a new
stabilization phase. Note that in the stable phase only one
player will be computing the optimal packet combination that
it can make and all the other player will save energy since
they will not transmit in the next stage.
VII. EXTENSION TO THE LIMITED FEEDBACK SCENARIO
In this section, we extend our previous study to the limited
feedback scenario. Without loss of generality, we will focus
our attention on the lossy feedback scenario in this section.
In this configuration, the feedback can be erased at some
players and thus can create uncertainties in the feedback matrix
and the overall system. Other limited feedback scenarios can
be considered and the same analysis holds. In game theory
terms, the lossy feedback scenarios means that neither the
information of the game nor the action sets are common
knowledge between players. To model this scenario, we use a
local system model [13] at each player to take account of the
uncertainties. At each stage of the game, for every player j,
three sets of packets are attributed to each player i 6= j:
• The Has set (denoted by Hji ): the set of packets received
and acknowledged by player i to player j.
• The Wants set (denoted byWji ): the set of the lost packets
or those which are not acknowledged by user i to player
j.
• The Uncertain set (denoted by U ji ) is defined as the set
of packets of player i whose state is uncertain at player
j. We have U ji ⊆ Wji .
Each player k stocks these information in a local feedback
matrix Fk = [fkij ], ∀ i ∈M, ∀ j, k ∈ N as follows:
fkij =

0 j ∈ Hki
1 j ∈ Wki \ Uki
x j ∈ Uki .
(55)
Using its local feedback matrix, each player k can compute
the optimal packet combination that it can encode. The ex-
pressions of these optimal packet combination can be found
in [38] for the completion time and the maximum decoding
delay and in [29] for the sum decoding delay. In this paper, we
will assume reciprocal channel i.e. the erasure probability in
the forward link (transmission link) is equal to the erasure on
the backward link (feedback link). Note that the assumption
10
is made without loss of generality since the expressions of the
optimal packet combination are available for general channels.
To simulate the system, we will use a modified version of
the reinforcement algorithm introduced in Section VI. Note
that each player knows its Has set and thus the learning rate
is a well defined quantity. However, the stimulus is not since
the players do no have access to the real payoff their action
generated.
The reinforcement learning [46] consists in updating the
probability distribution of action sj to be taken in time t+ 1
as follows:
xj,t+1(sj) = xj,t(sj) + λj s˜j,t(1{aj,t=sj } − xj,t(sj)), (56)
where s˜j,t is an estimate of the payoff at stage t of the game
and 1 is the step function. In our context, we will estimate
the payoff by its expected value computed when computing
the packet combination of each of the delay aspects.
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the simulation results comparing
the delay encountered by players when applying the PMP sys-
tem against the distributed cooperative data exchange system
in different scenarios. We first compare our optimal games
(complete and perfect information) of the completion time,
the maximum decoding delay and the sum decoding delay
against the centralized PMP solution proposed in [27] for the
completion time, in [25] for the maximum decoding delay
and in [9] for the sum decoding delay. We, then, do the
same comparison for our low complexity scenarios and finally
for the lossy feedback scenario. We also compare the delay
experienced by players against the player-player packet erasure
probability relatively to the base station-player packet erasure
probability since the short range communications are more
reliable than the base station-player communications [17],
[28].
In these simulations, the delay is computed over a large
number of iterations and the average value is presented. We
assume that the packet erasure probability remains constant
during a delivery period and change from iteration to iteration
while keeping its mean, P of the player-player and Q for the
base BS-players, constant. We also assume that each player
have perfect knowledge of the packet erasure probabilities
linking him to the other player (i.e. the estimation of this
probability is perfect).
Figure 1 depicts the comparison of the average completion
time achieved by the PMP scheme (denoted by OPT-PMP),
our perfect CDE scheme (denoted by OPT-CDE) and our low
complexity scenario (denoted by LC-CDE) in perfect feedback
scenario against the number of players M for N = 30, Q =
0.2, and P = 0.1. Figure 2 presents the mean completion time
against the ratio of the player-player and BS-player erasure
probability P/Q for M = 60, N = 30, and Q = 0.3.
Figure 3 depicts the average completion time achieved by
the PMP scheme (denoted by LS-PMP) and our CDE scheme
(denoted by LS-CDE) in lossy feedback scenario against the
number of players M for N = 30, Q = 0.2, and P = 0.1.
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Fig. 1. Mean completion time versus number of players M .
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Fig. 2. Mean completion time versus players erasure P .
Figure 4 presents the mean completion time in lossy feedback
against the ratio of the player-player and BS-player erasure
probability P/Q for M = 60, N = 30, and Q = 0.3.
Figure 5 and Figure 9 illustrate the same comparison in
perfect feedback scenario for the maximum decoding delay
and the sum decoding delay, respectively, against the number
of players M for N = 30, Q = 0.2, and P = 0.1. Figure 6 and
Figure 2 show this comparison in perfect feedback scenario
for the maximum decoding delay and the sum decoding delay,
respectively, against the player-player erasure probability P/Q
while keeping the BS-players erasure probability Q fixed for
M = 60, N = 30 and Q = 0.3.
Figure 7 and Figure 11 depict the aforementioned compar-
ison in lossy feedback scenario against number of players M
for N = 30, Q = 0.2, and P = 0.1 and Figure 8 and Figure 4
show this comparison in lossy feedback scenario against the
player-player erasure probability P/Q while keeping the BS-
players erasure probability Q fixed for M = 60, N = 30 and
Q = 0.3.
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Fig. 4. Mean completion time in lossy feedback versus players erasure P .
From all the figures, we can clearly see that our optimal co-
operative data exchange algorithms outperform the traditional
PMP approach. Figure 1, Figure 5, and Figure 9 illustrate
the gain in using a distributed algorithm when the player-
player channel conditions is better than the BS-player channel
(P = 0.5Q).
For a small number of players, the PMP setting is close to
our optimal approach. This can be explained by the fact that,
for a small number of players, the probability that the union of
the Has sets of all the players is equal to N is low. Thus, the
BS carries a good portion of the recovery process until this
condition occurs and then CDE can take place. This makes
the overall performance of close to the absolute PMP scheme.
However, the larger the number of players, there is a much
bigger probability that the union of their Has sets is equal to
N and thus the more CDE will be employed, the bigger the
gap to the PMP performance.
Figure 2 illustrates the mean completion time against the
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Fig. 6. Mean maximum delay versus players erasure P .
player-player erasure probability for a fixed BS-player erasure.
In this configuration, for the same erasure probability, the
PMP scheme outperform the optimal distributed approach.
This can be explained first by the fact that the BS has all the
packets whereas any one player has only a subset and thus,
in general, it has better ability to form coding combinations
that target more users than any single player. It can also
be explained by the fact that in our optimal CDE approach,
the approximation of the completion time using the decoding
delay approach requires the erasure probability between the
sender in large sense and the player. For the PMP scheme only
the base station is transmitting and therefore this probability
is fixed (from BS to players). However in the optimal CDE
scheme, all players can transmit and we approximate the
probability by the average erasure linking each player to all
the other players. This approximation degrades the scheme.
However as the channel linking players become better, CDE
starts to outperform even if players send less efficient coding
combinations and we clearly can see the difference between
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Fig. 8. Mean maximum delay in lossy feedback versus players erasure P .
our scheme and the PMP one. We also note that the low
complexity CDE outperforms the PMP scheme for a good
player-player channel comparing to the BS-player channel.
From Figure 3 and Figure 4, we clearly can see that the CDE
outperforms the PMP in the lossy feedback scenario for a good
enough player-player channel (P ≈ 0.6Q). However, the CDE
scheme rapidly degrades with the number of uncertainties
(player-player erasure probability). This can be explained by
the fact that for a low erasure, the uncertainties are relatively
rare events and therefore the system is nearly equivalent to
the low complexity CDE. However, as the erasure increases,
the uncertainties also increases and players are more likely to
take less efficient decision since the estimation will degrades.
The same analysis is applicable for the maximum decoding
delay (Figure 7 and Figure 8) and the sum decoding delay
(Figure 11 and Figure 12).
Figure 6 presents the average maximum decoding delay for
a fixed BS-player erasure probability against the player-player
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Fig. 10. Mean sum decoding delay versus players erasure P .
erasure probability. We can clearly see that as the player-
player communications become more reliable (geocentrically
close players), the gap between our optimal CDE scheme
and the PMP scheme increases. Note that also for the same
erasure probability between player-player and the BS-player,
our scheme outperforms the PMP. This can be explained by
the fact that the equality of erasure is only in the average
sense. Therefore, for a fixed packet combination, the minimum
expected delay that can be achieved by one of the players,
that can form this combination, is less than the expected delay
when the base station sends the combination. The same line of
toughs can be applied to explain Figure 10. For the maximum
and the sum decoding delay, the low complexity algorithm
performs worst that the PMP scheme in all scenarios. This
can be explained by the fact that in the low complexity CDE,
the system is suffering from both the conventional and the
cooperative decoding delay. Whereas, the optimal PMP and
optimal CDE do no suffer from the cooperative decoding
delay.
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P .
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we formulated the problem of minimizing the
delay of instantly decodable network coding for cooperative
data exchange in decentralized wireless network as cooperative
control game. We employed game theory as a tool to improve
the distributed solution by overcoming the need for a central
controller or additional signaling in the system. We modeled
the session by self-interested players in a non-cooperative
potential game. The utility functions were designed in such
way that increasing individual payoff results in a collective
behavior achieving both a desirable system performance and
the Nash bargaining solution. We formulated three games to
minimize each delay aspect in IDNC and improved these
formulations to include punishment policy and achieve Nash
bargaining solution. Through extensive simulations, our frame-
work is tested against the best performance that could be
found in the conventional point-to-multipoint (PMP) recovery
process in numerous cases: first we simulated the problem
with complete information. We, then, simulate with incomplete
information and finally we tested it in lossy feedback scenario.
Numerical results showed that our formulation with complete
information largely outperforms the conventional PMP scheme
in most practical scenarios and achieved a lower delay. The
advantage of this formulation is that it can be easily extended.
For example, the extension to the limited feedback scenario is
straightforward. As future perspectives, this formulation can
be extended to the case where not all the players are in the
range of each other. In other words, the utility function will not
be completely defined for the players. Moreover, the set of NE
of the game will be different from the set derived in this paper.
Another interesting research direction is the multicast cast with
limited range. In this scenario, the packet demand of each
player can differ and players are not all in the transmission
range of each other. Finally, the case of imperfect feedback is
another important and more practical extension.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Note that the cost function can be written as:
φ′(at, ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + ξ(at, ht), (A.1)
with:
ξ(at, ht) = ||C(at, ht)||∞ − ||C(at−1, ht−1)||∞. (A.2)
Let Q(t) be the set of players that can potentially increase
the cost function at stage t of the game. The mathematical
definition of this set is the following:
Q(t) = {i ∈M such that (A.3)
Ci(at−1, ht−1) + 1/(1− pi) > ||C(at−1, ht−1)||∞
and Mwi = 1}.
Clearly, if Q(t) = ∅, then any action profile a∗t ∈ A(t) is
a NE since all the profiles will not change the cost function
φ′(a∗t , ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1). In that case, we have PoA(t) =
1. Now assume Q(t) 6= ∅. For action profiles at the cost
function will increase according to the norm of the action
profile by the quantity:
φ′(at, ht)− φ′(at−1, ht−1) =
max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
if ||at||1 6= 1
max
i∈Q(t)∩Dwj,κj (t)
1
1− pi
if ||at||1 = aj(t) = 1.
(A.4)
Let Z(t) be the set of players that can target players in the
critical set Q(t) and reduce the increase in the cost function.
This set is defined as:
Z(t) = {j ∈M such that
max
i∈Q(t)∩Dwj,κj (t)
1
1− pi
< max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
}. (A.5)
Two cases can be distinguished:
• Z(t) = ∅ : all action profile a∗t will yield the same
cast function φ′(a∗t , ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
.
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Therefore all action profile are NE of the game and the
PoA is equal to 1.
• Z(t) 6= 0 : action profile a∗t = aj(t) such that j ∈ Z(t)
will yield a lower cost function than the other profiles.
Define Y0(t) = max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
as the increase in the cost
function when not exactly one player is transmitting and
Yj(t) = max
i∈Q(t)∩Dwj,κj (t)
1
1− pi
the increase when only player
j is transmitting. Clearly for action profiles a∗t such that
||a∗t ||1 = 0 are not NE since the unilateral deviation of player
i ∈ Z(t) will decrease the cost function. For action profile
a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 > 2, for any unilateral deviation, we have
||at,i, a∗t,−i|| > 1. Therefore, the cost function is unchanged
and all these action profiles are NE. Let a∗t be an action profile
such that ||a∗t ||1 = aj(t) = 1, then the difference in the cost
function for any unilateral deviation of player is:
φ′(at,i, a
,
t,−iht)− φ′(a∗t , ht)
= ξ(at,i, a
∗
t,−i, ht)− ξ(a∗t , ht) = Y0(t)− Yj(t). (A.6)
Thus, any unilateral deviation will yield the same or a higher
cost function. These profiles are NE of the game. Let the action
profile be a∗t with ||a∗t ||1 = ai(t) + aj(t) = 2. Two scenarios
can occur:
• i /∈ Z(t) and j /∈ Z(t): By the same argument than for
the case where ||a∗t ||1 > 2, any unilateral deviation will
yield the same cost φ′(a∗t , ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + Y0(t).
Therefore it is a NE of the game.
• i ∈ Z(t) or j ∈ Z(t): By the same argument than for
the case a∗t = 0, the cost function can be decreased by
unilateral deviation of player i if j ∈ Z(t) and inversely.
This scenario is not a NE of the game.
We now characterize the set of all NE of the game:
E(t) =
{
A(t) if Z(t) = ∅
E1(t) otherwise ,
(A.7)
where
E1(t) = {at ∈ A(t) such that ||at||1 = 1 or ||at||1 > 2
or (||at||1 = ai(t) + aj(t) = 2 and i, j /∈ Z(t))}.
(A.8)
The PoA of Game 3 can be expressed as follows:
PoA(t) =
1 if Z(t) = ∅
1−
Y0(t)− min
j∈Z(t)
(Yj(t))
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + Y0(t)
otherwise .
(A.9)
APPENDIX B
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Note that the cost function can be written as:
φ′(at, ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + η(at, , ht), (B.1)
with:
η(at, ht) =
{
1 if ||D(at, ht)||∞ > ||D(at−1, ht−1)||∞
0 otherwise .
(B.2)
Let Q(t) be the set of players that can potentially increase
the cost function at stage t of the game. The mathematical
definition of this set is the following:
Q(t) = {i ∈M such that (B.3)
Di(at−1, ht−1) = ||D(at−1, ht−1)||∞ and Mwi = 1}.
Clearly, if Q(t) = ∅, then any action profile a∗t ∈ A(t) is
a NE since all the profiles will not change the cost function
φ′(a∗t , ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1). In that case, we have PoA(t) =
1. Now assume Q(t) 6= ∅. Let q(t) ∈ {0, 1}M such that
qi(t) = 1 iff i ∈ Q(t). Two cases can be distinguished:
1) @ i ∈M such that Dwi,κi(t) ◦ q(t) = 0.
2) ∃ i ∈M such that Dwi,κi(t) ◦ q(t) = 0. Let Z(t) be the
set of such players.
In the first case, all action profile will yield the same value
of the cost φ′(a∗t , ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + 1 and thus all of
them are NE of the game and PoA(t) = 1. In the second
case, the cost varies with the chosen action profile. Let a∗t
be an action profile such that ||a∗t ||1 > 2. For any unilateral
deviation, we have ||(at,i, a∗t,−i)||1 > 1. By definition of the
delay D, we have:
D(at,i, a
∗
t,−i, ht) = D(at−1, ht−1) +M
w(t). (B.4)
Since we assumed Q(t) 6= ∅ then we have:
||D(at,i, a∗t,−i, ht)||∞ = ||D(at−1, ht−1)||∞ + 1
= ||D(a∗t , ht)||∞. (B.5)
Thus all action profile a∗t with ||a∗t ||1 > 2 are NE of the
game that yields the maximum value of the cost φ′(a∗t , ht) =
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + 1. Consider now the action profile a
∗
t = 0,
then for some deviation the cost decreases by the quantity:
φ′(a∗t , ht)− φ′(at,i, a∗t,−i, ht) = 1
, ∀ at,i 6= a∗t,i ∈ Ai(t), ∀ i ∈ Z(t). (B.6)
Therefore, the action profile of this type are not NE of the
game. Let the action profile be a∗t with ||a∗t ||1 = ai(t) +
aj(t) = 2. Two scenarios can occur:
• i /∈ Z(t) and j /∈ Z(t): By the same argument than
for the case where ||a∗t ||1 > 2, any unilateral deviation
will yield the same cost φ′(a∗t , ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + 1.
Therefore it is a NE of the game.
• i ∈ Z(t) or j ∈ Z(t): By the same argument than for
the case a∗t = 0, the cost function can be decreased by
unilateral deviation of player i if j ∈ Z(t) and inversely.
This scenario is not a NE of the game.
Finally consider the action profile a∗t with ||a∗t ||1 = ai(t) = 1.
The following options may arise:
• i /∈ Z(t): By the same argument than for the case where
||a∗t ||1 > 2, any unilateral deviation will yield the same
cost φ′(a∗t , ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + 1. Therefore it is a
NE of the game.
• i ∈ Z(t): All deviation will increase the cost function.
Hence it is a NE of the game.
We now characterize the set of all NE of the game:
E(t) =
{
A(t) if Z(t) = ∅
E1(t) otherwise ,
(B.7)
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where
E1(t) = {at ∈ A(t) such that ||at||1 = 1 or ||at||1 > 2
or (||at||1 = ai(t) + aj(t) = 2 and i, j /∈ Z(t))}.
(B.8)
The PoA of Game 2 can be expressed as follows:
PoA(t) =

1 if Z(t) = ∅
1− 1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + 1
otherwise .
(B.9)
APPENDIX C
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Note that the cost function can be written as:
φ′(at, ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + ψ(at,ω(t)), (C.1)
with:
ψ((at,ω(t)) = (C.2){
||Mw(t)||1 if ||at||1 6= 1
||Dwi,κi(t)||1 otherwise with i such that ai(t) = ||at||1.
By definition of Dwi,κi(t), we have ||Mw(t)||1 >||Dwi,κi(t)||1, ∀ i ∈M and therefore:
argmax
at∈A(t)
φ′(at, ht) = argmax
at∈A(t)
ψ((at,ω(t))
= argmax
||at||1 6=1
||Mw(t)||1 (C.3)
argmin
at∈A(t)
φ′(at, ht) = argmin
at∈A(t)
ψ((at,ω(t))
= argmin
||at||1=ai(t)=1
||Dwi,κi(t)||1. (C.4)
Let a∗t be an action profile such that ||a∗t ||1 > 2. For any
unilateral deviation, we have ||(at,i, a∗t,−i)||1 > 1. Therefore
the cost function is unchanged by any unilateral deviation i.e.
φ(at,i, a
∗
t,−i, ht) = φ(a
∗
t , ht), ∀ at,i ∈ Ai(t), ∀ i ∈ M.
Hence all action profile a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 > 2 are NE.
These NE yields the highest cost (φ(at−1, ht−1)−||Mw(t)||1)
among all possible action profiles. Then, we have:
max
s∈E(t)
φ′(s, ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Mw(t)||1. (C.5)
Similarly, let a∗t be an action profile such that ||a∗t ||1 =
aj(t) = 1. For any unilateral deviation, we have
||(at,i, a∗t,−i)||1 6= 1. In terms of cost function, we have:
φ′(at,i, a
∗
t,−i, ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Mw(t)||1
> φ′(a∗t , ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Dwj ,κj (t)||1
, ∀ at,i ∈ Ai(t), ∀ i ∈M. (C.6)
Which conclude that all action profile a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 = 1
are NE. Let a∗t = 0, then any deviation decreases the cost by
the quantity:
φ′(a∗t , ht)− φ′(at,i, a∗t,−i, ht) = ||Mw(t)||1 − ||Dwi,κi(t)||1
, ∀ at,i 6= a∗t,i ∈ Ai(t), ∀ i ∈M. (C.7)
Clearly, these action profiles are not NE of the game.
Finally, consider the action profile a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 =
ai(t) + aj(t) = 2. The unilateral deviation of player i or j
will decrease the cost by the same quantity than in equation
(C.7) (replace i by j if it is player j that deviates).Which
conclude that these type of action profile are not NE of the
game. We now can characteristic the set of all possible NE at
stage t of the game:
E(t) = {at ∈ A(t) such that ||at||1 = 1 or ||at||1 > 2}.
(C.8)
The PoA of Game 1 can be expressed as follows:
PoA(t) =
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Dωi,κi ||1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Mw(t)||1
. (C.9)
We can clearly see that 0 ≤ ||Dwj ,κj (t)||1 ≤ ||Mw(t)||1 − 1.
Therefore, the PoA can be bound by the following quantities:
1− ||M
w(t)||1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Mw(t)||1
≤
PoA(t) ≤ 1− 1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Mw(t)||1
. (C.10)
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As for game 3, the utility function of Game 4 can be written
as:
φ′(at, ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + ξ(at, ht), (D.1)
with:
ξ(at, ht) = ||at||1 +
||D(at, ht)−D(at−1, ht−1)||1
M
+ ||C(at, ht)||∞ − ||C(at−1, ht−1)||∞. (D.2)
Let Q(t) be the set of players that can potentially increase
the expected completion time at stage t of the game. The
mathematical definition of this set is the following:
Q(t) = {i ∈M such that (D.3)
Ci(at−1, ht−1) + 1/(1− pi) > ||C(at−1, ht−1)||∞
and Mwi = 1}.
Assume Q(t) = ∅, then any action profile a∗t ∈ A(t) will not
increase the maximum decoding delay and we have:
ξ(at, ht) = ||at||1 +
||D(at, ht)−D(at−1, ht−1)||1
M
(D.4)
=

||Mw(t)||1
M
if ||at||1 = 0
1 +
||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
if ||at||1 = ai(t) = 1
||at||1 +
||Mw(t)||1
M
otherwise .
Clearly, we can see that all the profiles a∗t with ||a∗t ||1 > 1
or ||a∗t ||1 = 0 are not anymore NE of the game. Only action
profile with one entry not equal to 0 are NE. Now assume
Q(t) 6= ∅ and let Z(t) be the set of players that can target
players in the critical set Q(t) and reduce the increase in the
cost function. This set is defined as:
Z(t) = {j ∈M such that
max
i∈Q(t)∩Dwj,κj (t)
1
1− pi
< max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
}. (D.5)
Two cases can be distinguished:
• Z(t) = ∅ : the expected completion time will increase
by the same amount max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
for all action profiles.
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• Z(t) 6= 0 : some action profiles lead to lower increase of
the expected completion time than others.
Define Y0(t) = max
i∈Q(t)
1
1− pi
as the increase in the cost
function when not exactly one player is transmitting and
Yj(t) = max
i∈Q(t)∩Dwj,κj (t)
1
1− pi
the increase when only player
j is transmitting. If Z(t) = ∅ for an action profile a∗t , the
cost function can be expressed as:
ξ(a∗t , ht) = Y0(t)
+

||Mw(t)||1
M
if ||at||1 = 0
1 +
||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
if ||at||1 = ai(t) = 1
||at||1 +
||Mw(t)||1
M
otherwise .
(D.6)
Clearly action profiles a∗t of type ||a∗t ||1 6= 1 are no more
NE of the game. Now assume Z(t) 6= ∅ the utility varies
with the chosen action profile. Let a∗t be an action profile
such that ||a∗t ||1 = α > 1. For some unilateral deviation of
player that are transmitting, the cost function will decrease. In
other words, we have:
φ′(at,i, a
∗
t,−i, ht)− φ′(a∗t , ht) = (D.7)
1 > 0 if ||at,i, a∗t,−i||1 > 1
Y0(t)− Yi(t) + 1 +
||Mw(t)|| − ||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
> 0
if ||at,i, a∗t,−i||1 = 1 and i ∈ Z(t)
1 +
||Mw(t)|| − ||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
> 0
if ||at,i, a∗t,−i||1 = 1 and i /∈ Z(t).
Thus, all action profile a∗t with ||a∗t ||1 > 1 are not NE and
it is clear to see that action profile a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 = 0
are also not NE of the game. Let a∗t be an action profile such
that ||a∗t ||1 = ai(t) = 1 and i /∈ Z(t). The difference in the
cost when player i deviates is:
φ′(a∗t , ht)− φ′(at,i, a∗t,−i, ht)
= 1 +
||Dwi,κi(t)||1 − ||Mw(t)||
M
> 0. (D.8)
Therefore such action profile is not a NE. Now consider the
action profile a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 = ai(t) = 1 and i ∈ Z(t).
The difference in the utility if any player deviates:
φ′(at,i, a
∗
t,−i, ht)− φ′(a∗t , ht) = (D.9)
1 + Y0(t)− Yi(t) +
||Mw(t)|| − ||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
> 0
if ||at,j , a∗t,−j ||1 = 2
Y0(t)− Yi(t) +
||Mw(t)|| − ||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
> 0
if ||at,j , a∗t,−j ||1 = 0.
The set of all NE of the Game 4 can be expressed as:
E(t) = (D.10)
{at ∈ A(t) s.t. ||at||1 = ai(t) = 1, i ∈ Z(t)}
if Z(t) 6= ∅
{at ∈ A(t) s.t. ||at||1 = 1}
otherwise.
The PoA of Game 4 can be expressed as follows:
PoA′(t) = (D.11)
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Yi(t)
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Yi(t)
if Z(t) 6= ∅
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Y0(t)
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1 + Y0(t)
otherwise .
Moreover, the PoA can be bounded by the following expres-
sions:
1 ≥ PoA′(t) ≥

1−
1 + Y0(t)− min
j∈Z(t)
(Yj(t))
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + 2 + Y0(t)
if Z(t) 6= ∅
1− 1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + 2 + Y0(t)
otherwise .
(D.12)
APPENDIX E
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As for game 2, the utility function of Game 4 can be written
as:
φ′(at, ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + η(at, , ht), (E.1)
with:
η(at, ht) = ||at||1 +
||D(at, ht)−D(at−1, ht−1)||1
M
+{
1 if ||D(at, ht)||∞ > ||D(at−1, ht−1)||∞
0 otherwise .
(E.2)
Let Q(t) be the set of players that can potentially increase
the cost function at stage t of the game as defined for Game
2. If Q(t) = ∅, then any action profile a∗t ∈ A(t) will not
increase the maximum decoding delay and we have:
η(at, ht) = ||at||1 +
||D(at, ht)−D(at−1, ht−1)||1
M
(E.3)
=

||Mw(t)||1
M
if ||at||1 = 0
1 +
||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
if ||at||1 = ai(t) = 1
||at||1 +
||Mw(t)||1
M
otherwise .
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Clearly, we can see that all the profiles a∗t with ||a∗t ||1 > 1
or ||a∗t ||1 = 0 are not anymore NE of the game. Only action
profile with one entry not equal to 0 are NE. Define Z(t) as
the set of players that can transmit a combination such that
the maximum decoding delay do not increase (see definition
in Game 2). If Z(t) = ∅ it is clear to see that only the action
profile with ||a∗t ||1 = ai(t) = 1 are NE and yield the cost
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + 2 +
||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
.
Now assume Z(t) 6= ∅ the utility varies with the chosen
action profile. Let a∗t be an action profile such that ||a∗t ||1 =
α > 1. For some unilateral deviation of player that are
transmitting, the cost function will decrease. In other words,
we have:
φ′(a∗t , ht)− φ′(at,i, a∗t,−i, ht) = (E.4)
1 > 0 if ||at,i, a∗t,−i||1 > 1
2 +
||Mw(t)|| − ||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
> 0
if ||at,i, a∗t,−i||1 = 1 and i ∈ Z(t)
1 +
||Mw(t)|| − ||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
> 0
if ||at,i, a∗t,−i||1 = 1 and i /∈ Z(t).
Thus, all action profile a∗t with ||a∗t ||1 > 1 are not NE and
it is clear to see that action profile a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 = 0
are also not NE of the game. Let a∗t be an action profile such
that ||a∗t ||1 = ai(t) = 1 and i /∈ Z(t). The difference in the
cost when player i deviates is:
φ′(a∗t , ht)− φ′(at,i, a∗t,−i, ht)
= 1 +
||Dwi,κi(t)||1 − ||Mw(t)||
M
> 0. (E.5)
Therefore such action profile is not a NE. Now consider the
action profile a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 = ai(t) = 1 and i ∈ Z(t).
The difference in the utility if any player deviates:
φ′(at,i, a
∗
t,−i, ht)− φ′(a∗t , ht) = (E.6)
2 +
||Mw(t)|| − ||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
> 0
if ||at,j , a∗t,−j ||1 = 0
||Mw(t)|| − ||Dwi,κi(t)||1
M
> 0
if ||at,j , a∗t,−j ||1 = 2.
The set of all NE of the Game 4 can be expressed as:
E(t) = (E.7)
{at ∈ A(t) s.t. ||at||1 = 1}
if Z(t) = ∅
{at ∈ A(t) s.t. ||at||1 = ai(t) = 1, i ∈ Z(t)}
otherwise.
The PoA of Game 4 can be expressed as follows:
PoA′(t) = (E.8)
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 2
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 2
if Z(t) = ∅
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) +
||Dωi,κi ||1
M
+ 1
otherwise .
Moreover, the PoA can be bounded by the following expres-
sions:
1 ≥ PoA′(t) ≥

1− 1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + 3
if Z(t) = ∅
1− 1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + 2
otherwise .
(E.9)
APPENDIX F
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Similarly to Game 1, the cost function of Game 3 can be
written as:
φ′(at, ht) = φ
′(at−1, ht−1) + ψ(at,ω(t)), (F.1)
with:
ψ((at,ω(t)) = (F.2){
||Mw(t)||1 + ||at||1 if ||at||1 6= 1
||Dwi,κi(t)||1 + 1 otherwise with i s.t. ai(t) = ||at||1.
Let a∗t be an action profile such that ||a∗t ||1 > 2. For any
unilateral deviation of a player who is transmitting, the cost
function increase. In other words, we have:
φ′(a∗t , ht)− φ′(at,i, a∗t,−i, ht) =
||a∗t ||1 − ||(at,i, a∗t,−i)||1 = 1
∀ ai(t) 6= a∗i (t) ∈ Ai(t) such that a∗i (t) = 1. (F.3)
The cost function changes by some unilateral deviation.
Hence all action profile a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 > 2 are no more
NE of the game. By the same argument used in Game 1, the
action profiles a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 = 0 or ||a∗t ||1 = 2 are not
NE of the game.
For the action profile a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 = aj(t) = 1, the
difference of cost function for any unilateral deviation is the
following:
φ′(at,i, a
∗
t,−i, ht)− φ′(a∗t , ht) =
||Mw(t)||1 − ||Dwj ,κj (t)||1 + 1 > 0
∀ ai(t) 6= a∗i (t) ∈ Ai(t), ∀ i ∈M \ {j}
||Mw(t)||1 − ||Dwj ,κj (t)||1 − 1 ≥ 0
∀ aj(t) 6= a∗j (t) ∈ Aj(t).
(F.4)
Since no unilateral deviation can yield a lower cost, there-
fore all action profile a∗t such that ||a∗t ||1 = 1 are NE of
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the game. The set of all possible NE at stage t of the game
becomes:
E(t) = {at ∈ A(t) such that ||at||1 = 1}. (F.5)
The PoA of Game 3 can be expressed as:
PoA(t) =
min
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Dωi,κi ||1 + 1
max
||at||1=ai(t)=1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Dωi,κi ||1 + 1
.
(F.6)
The PoA of Game 3 can be bound by:
1− ||M
w(t)||1 − 1
φ′(at−1, ht−1) + ||Mw(t)||1
≤ PoA(t) ≤ 1. (F.7)
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